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 In this thesis, we concern ourselves with the security of drone systems under jamming-
based attacks.  We explore a relatively new concept we previously devised, known as hardware 
sandboxing, to provide runtime monitoring of boundary signals and isolation through resource 
virtualization for non-trusted system-on-chip (SoC) components.  The focus of this thesis is the 
synthesis of this design and structure with the anti-jamming, security needs of drone systems. We 
utilize Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based development and target embedded Linux 
for our hardware sandbox and drone hardware/software system.   
 We design and implement our working concept on the Digilent Zybo FPGA, which uses 
the Xilinx Zynq System.  Our design is validated via simulation-based tests to mimic jamming 
attacks and standalone, stationary tests with commercial transmitter and receiver equipment.  In 
both cases, we are successful in detecting and isolating unwanted behavior.  This thesis presents 
the current work performed, observations, and the future potential of hardware sandboxing in 
drone systems.  
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
1.1     Overview 
In today’s society, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as aerial drones, 
have become prevalent and useful across many domains.  Drones are used in the agriculture 
industry to give farmers an aerial perspective on their crops, which allows for better 
understanding of crop performance and thus, better yields [1].  Drone use has grown in the 
commercial and consumer recreation sector and is pertinent in military space for surveillance and 
precision strikes [2].  In fact, military drone usage is expected to continue to grow by 50% in the 
next four years [3].  This rise in usage demands security.   
Remotely controlled drones are operated indirectly through a user by transmitting radio 
frequency (RF) waves allowing a receiver on the drone to receive and decode the transmission 
into signals for processing in the system.  Because control happens indirectly through this RF 
manner, an attacker can potentially hijack and affect the control of a drone by sending their own 
RF signals.  Naturally, we wish to prevent this attack from manifesting to the best of our ability. 
In this thesis, we explore a method in which we can achieve the detection of such a 
control attack and the prevention of the spread of improper control signals.  Our method utilizes 
the hardware technology of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), which allow for quick, 
efficient development due to their programmable nature through the use of HDL languages such 
as VHDL or Verilog.  The method we use in this thesis is a relatively new concept we created, 
known as hardware sandboxing.  Our goals of this thesis are to study the prior, practical 
synthesis of the hardware sandbox for drone use, design a secure drone system on FPGAs that 




1.2    Motivation 
In the RF world, such aforementioned control attacks are referred to as frequency 
jamming, which is a very real and common threat seen today.  Jamming is defined as the 
disruption of RF signals by an attacker transmitting in the same frequency band as the target.  As 
shown in [4], RF jamming, like in our drone systems, has a strong likelihood of occurring.  This 
has already been seen in use during the Iraq War with the Warlock RF jamming systems to 
effectively block UAV systems. 
With regards to frequency jammers, there are many different types with varying degrees 
of effectiveness.  There are simple designs, such as the constant jammer, which transmits a 
jamming signal continuously, or the random jammer, which only transmits intermittently [5].  
For more useful jammers, there exist others, such as the reactive jammer where a signal is only 
sent when target transmission is sensed, which has proven to be effective [5], [6], [7], or other 
intelligent jammers which know the protocols and modulation used.  Traditional means to limit 
the effects of jamming have turned to spread spectrum techniques, most notably frequency 
hopping (FHSS) and direct sequence (DSSS).  In FHSS, a sender will quickly hop along 
channels across a wide frequency band in a specified order, while in DSSS, a sender will 
distribute their message on a narrow band across a wide frequency range through the use of pre-
determined spreading codes.  The original message is multiplied by the spreading codes to 
achieve this level of spread-spectrum.  A receiver can use the same codes to “de-spread” the 
received transmission back to its original message.  While both of these techniques are useful, a 
powerful or intelligent jammer can still effectively jam at least parts of the transmission, with 
FHSS being more susceptible to simple, narrow-band jamming.  With great power devoted to 
jamming, full jamming of these spread spectrum signals is possible [8].   
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 In order to detect jamming, comparing signal strength or signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) is a 
common method [6], [9], however this has trouble when dealing with energy efficient, low-
power jamming such as reactive or intelligent jammers.  To combat the reactive jammers, other 
techniques such as in [10] have looked at comparing received packet loss at the preamble of the 
received transmission to the rest of the message.  This however does not take into account other 
intelligent jammers, such as powerful ones where modulation techniques are known and can 
know to jam the start of the sent message.  
Our end-goal is to be able to detect jamming regardless of jammer in RF drone systems.  
In jamming, an attacker transmits their signal on the same frequency band to interfere with the 
correct signal.  The attacker’s goal is to distort the signal to the extent where either the receiver is 
unable to correctly receive the transmission, resulting in total denial-of-service, or parts of the 
transmission are incorrect, resulting in loss of integrity and possible denial-of-service for certain 
aspects of the system.  Thus, the drone has been compromised and can be brought down by the 
attacker due to loss of control.  In a drone system, the controller transmits the signals to be read 
by the receiver to generate the correct control bit signals for flight control.  Because in a valid 
transmission these bit signals follow a predefined protocol, we can monitor these incoming 
signals to continuously check that no deviation occurs.  We assume any deviation from this 
predefined behavior indicates denial-of-service, and thus, indicates jamming is present.  In order 
to do this, we can utilize a hardware component we designed known as the hardware sandbox.     
While more detail regarding the design and structure of the hardware sandbox is given in 
Chapter 2, the concept of the hardware sandbox was first conceived from the need to combat 
hardware Trojans.  Hardware Trojans are malicious alterations or additions in intellectual 
property (IP) hardware cores which lay dormant until activation.  They can be inserted by non-
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trusted entities at any of the various stages of IP integration, such as the design, verification, and 
manufacturing stages [11][12], due to the design and production typically being outsourced.  A 
Trojan is said to contain both a trigger and a payload, such that when a specific input or 
condition is satisfied for the trigger, the Trojan is activated and its damaging effects, or payload, 
are released.  While difficult to detect prior to runtime, if we consider that the Trojan’s payload 
will have a discernible effect on the output signals of the IP, we can monitor the signals at 
runtime at the boundary of the component and check to ensure they satisfy the original design 
description and protocol.  We can isolate any IP we deem non-trusted through the monitor 
process and virtualization of any system-level resources the IP utilizes.   
This same concept can be applied in drone jamming.  In this case, the trigger is the drone 
jammer and the payload is the denial-of-service and deviation of control signal behavior.  Due to 
this, we can treat parts of the drone system as non-trusted and build a hardware sandbox to 
isolate and protect the remaining system from potentially compromised elements.   
1.3    Scope of Thesis 
This thesis presents the first system design utilizing the hardware sandbox to detect and 
isolate jamming attacks on drones.  The goal here is to design, implement, and study a hardware 
sandbox for a drone flight system that has the capability to detect and prevent compromised 
signals from reaching and adversely affecting the rest of the system.  To do this, we must first 
delve into the structure, general design, and functionality of the hardware sandbox to provide the 
necessary means for this task.  Therefore, sufficient prior background and tests are given in 
addition to ones in drone jamming to show both how the hardware sandbox works and prove that 
it does work on testable hardware Trojan benchmarks.   
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While we based our system and hardware sandbox design around a functioning drone and 
its necessary elements, such as the consideration of booting an embedded operating system for 
running flight software, building a fully-working jammer and testing on a flying aircraft is out of 
the scope of this thesis.  Our goal is focused more on the design and study of the hardware 
sandbox, and therefore, we primarily utilized simulation-based testing to simulate jamming 
attacks and verify the results from our hardware sandbox.  We have, though, performed basic 
tests on stationary hardware utilizing solely the transmitter and receiver to verify performance 
under real-world timing constraints and ensure accurate communication between software and 
hardware.   
For the drone system, we utilized commercially available equipment for the controller, 
receiver, and testing platform.  We used the Spektrum DX7SE transmitter and AR7010 receiver 
and built our hardware sandbox around the protocols used in this equipment.  We also used the 
Digilent Zybo FPGA, a Xilinx Zynq-based board, for implementation and testing.  Through the 
board's FPGA fabric for programmable logic and the Zynq's processing system featuring a dual-
core Cortex A9 processor, we were able to accurately create our hardware/software-based 
design.  The hardware portions of the drone system and hardware sandbox were written in 
VHDL, and the drivers and software-based tests were implemented in C. 
1.4       Summary of Chapters 
The remainder of the thesis is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 (Hardware Sandbox) details 
the concept, design, and validation of the hardware sandbox, Chapter 3 (System Design and 
Implementation for Jamming Prevention) goes in depth on the design of the hexacopter system 
and the hardware sandbox tailored for detecting and preventing jamming, Chapter 4 (Tests and 
Results) shows the test results obtained in order to validate the anti-jamming design presented in 
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Chapter 3, and Chapter 5 (Conclusion and Future Work) gives the conclusion and offers a few 




Chapter 2   Hardware Sandbox 
2.1     Overview  
 The hardware sandbox was born on the concept of isolation in software sandboxing and 
targets potentially malicious activity in hardware IPs and components.  As discussed in [13], 
there are a number of different techniques used by sandboxes in software to enforce isolation.  
Among these, the inline reference monitor/system call sandbox and the hardware memory 
isolation categories are of particular interest for the nature of sandboxing hardware IPs and 
components.  In the first set of categories, the goal is to place run-time checks on resource 
accesses inside or on the boundary of the application to enforce a given security policy, and in 
the second, segments of resources are provided to the application itself and a manager handles 
the data transfer in the sandbox to the rest of the system.  We can utilize these two ideas in 
hardware to create a sandbox which is capable of monitoring a non-trusted hardware IP for 
malicious behavior while still ensuring isolation from the rest of the system.   
2.2     Design and Components 
In order to provide the necessary isolation and monitor of a potential malicious IP, we 
need to consider and include multiple components in our overarching hardware sandbox 
structure.  Figure 1 displays a representation of what the hardware sandbox must consist of to 
achieve the sandbox goals.  These components include a properties checker for the monitoring of 
the sandboxed IP’s signals, virtual resources for isolating possible attacks on shared, physical 
resources in a system, status and configuration registers for processor control, and a sandbox 
manager for controlling the data flow inside the hardware sandbox.  These components are 




Figure 1.  Hardware Sandbox Structure 
 
2.2.1    Properties Checker 
This component consists of either one or more checkers used for runtime monitoring and 
enforcement of security rules defined by the system integrator at compile time.  A checker is 
created based off the incoming or outgoing signal properties of an IP component in the sandbox 
and can be limited to only a subset of IP signals and properties for overhead reduction.  Our 
implementation of the properties checkers is currently based around the Open Verification 
Library by Accellera [14].  While this library gives us the ability to create our own expressions to 
define the necessary properties of the signals to actively enforce and monitor, a more formal 
method of defining signal properties exists in verification languages, such as the Property 
Specification Language [15].   
2.2.1.1   Open Verification Library 
The Open Verification Library (OVL) consists of a series of parameterizable assertion 
checkers which take in some form of an input signal and monitors and enforces the property 
needing to be checked.  There are many OVL checkers, some more specific in the property or 
policy being checked; however, there are only a handful of components that can be synthesized 
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directly into hardware.  Of these, the most powerful in terms of assertion checking is the OVL 
Cycle Sequence, which we commonly use for our properties checkers in the hardware Sandbox.  
The OVL Cycle Sequence takes in primarily an input vector signal, known as test_expression, 
and outputs a signal known as fire.  Essentially, when a check is active the Cycle Sequence 
samples the MSB of the test_expression sequence on the rising clock edge.  As long as this bit 
value is high, the check passes, and the sequence is left-shifted by one bit.  This process repeats 
for as many clock cycles as specified by the system integrator.  If at any point in time during the 
check the sampled bit is low, the check ends and fire is asserted, indicating a problem has 
occurred.  In order for a check to begin, the MSB of the original test_expression must be high.  If 
pipelining is specified by the system integrator, multiple checks can take place at the same time; 
otherwise, the previous check must finish before beginning a new one.  Through its 
customization and by generating test_expression from multiple signals based on the temporal and 
spatial properties specified or observed, the Cycle Sequence can be a very powerful runtime 
assertion checker and suitable for our needs.  For example, consider the system consisting of the 
signals req, busy, and done.  If in this system our signals are observed such that when req is 
asserted, busy is asserted on the following clock cycle, and after busy is finished, done is 
asserted, we can utilize the OVL Cycle Sequence in VHDL and build test_expression through 
concatenation in the following way: “req & (busy and not done) & (done and not busy)”.  In 
VHDL, this expression is three bits wide and represents our observed protocol.   
2.2.1.2   Property Specification Language 
 The Property Specification Language (PSL) by Accellera, based off the Sugar Language 
developed by IBM, is an assertion based verification language used for model checking, and 
evolved into an IEEE standard (1850-2005) [15].  At its core, PSL is used to temporally specify 
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and define the properties of a system under verification through a combination of the temporal 
logic Linear Time Logic (LTL) and regular expressions.  PSL consists of 4 layers: the Boolean 
layer, the temporal layer, the verification layer, and the modeling layer.  Basic relationships 
among observable interface signals and state variables are defined at the Boolean layer, which 
take the form of Boolean expressions in the chosen HDL flavor used: VHDL (reset and ena) or 
Verilog (reset && ena).  The temporal layer is used to describe signals’ behavior over finite or 
infinite sequence of states.  A sequence is built from basic Boolean operators from the below 
layer combined with specific sequence operators.  PSL’s temporal layer supports both Sequential 
Extended Regular Expression (SERE)-style operators and LTL-style operators, which allow for 
the evaluation of an expression across multiple clock cycles. Said system properties are built 
utilizing these expressions and Boolean operators to define behavior.  For example, taking into 
consideration two signals in a system which must be asserted at some time, req and ack, for an 
LTL-style expression to indicate that whenever req is asserted at some time point, ack must be 
asserted on the very next time point, we write our expression as “always ack -> next req.”  
Utilizing SEREs, with the inclusion of the signals busy and done, the expression “always {req} 
|=> {ack; busy[+]; done}” indicates that when req is asserted on some time point, the following 
sequence occurs starting at the very next time point: ack is asserted for one time period, busy is 
asserted for at least one time period after ack, and after busy, done is asserted, signaling the end 
of the sequence.  Because PSL is primarily a verification language, the verification layer exists to 
provide all necessary directives for a verification tool to check for the validity of a property 
defined from the two above layers. A common directive, assert, for example, will instruct a 
verification tool to report a failure if a certain defined property does not hold.  Lastly, the 
modeling layer utilizes the underlying HDL language to model combinational signals or other 
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aspects of the system that are not directly part of the design, but are needed for accurate 
verification purposes.   
2.2.2   Virtual Resources 
Regarding this component, the concept of a sandbox requires that resources needed by 
IPs are provided in virtual form within the sandbox where they can be used by an IP without 
negatively affecting the rest of the system.  Typically, the virtual resources considered for 
inclusion are those that are shared between the trusted system and the potentially malicious 
component because we want to limit the effects of a compromised IP.  The main advantage here 
is that the interface between virtual resources within the sandbox and physical resources follows 
a secure protocol and can never cause a denial-of-service.  Any attempt from a malicious entity 
to alter a system’s resource or peripheral will be nullified by the virtual resource.  Examples of 
virtual resources include a virtual UART, virtual VGA, or virtual memory.   
2.2.3   Status and Configuration Registers 
Next, the hardware sandbox features a set of status and configuration registers to be used 
for the communication between the sandbox manager and the rest of the system. Statistics on the 
behavior of IPs in the sandbox can be recorded for further analysis.  If misbehavior occurs and is 
caught via a checker, this event can be indicated in a status register for the processor to read and 
react accordingly.   
2.2.4   Sandbox Manager 
The final aspect to consider in the hardware sandbox is a manager.  The manager is 
simply in charge of all data exchange and handling inside the sandbox.  This includes the 
exchange between virtual resources and their physical counterparts, as well as the handling of the 
results from the checkers and the potential configuration of the sandbox. 
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2.3     Validation Tests and Implementation 
 To validate our design and demonstrate how the hardware sandbox works in practice, we 
previously implemented a series of UART module-based hardware Trojans from trust-HUB [16].   
Trust-HUB, founded by experts from the University of Connecticut, is seen as the benchmark 
resource in hardware Trojans today.  All of the UART modules are based off the RS232 protocol 
with parity.  Therefore, it is first necessary to understand how this protocol works. 
 
Figure 2.  RS232 Protocol with Parity Used by the UART Modules 
 
Figure 2 outlines the RS232 transmission protocol.  When a transaction begins taking 
place, RS232 synchronizes using the start bit, which is logic low, to signal the start of the frame 
before sending the data.  Once the synchronization period is over, RS232 sends the data, bit-by-
bit, beginning with the LSB.  After, the parity bit is sent, followed by the end-of-frame stop bit, 
both of which are logic high.  Any future transaction must repeat this process by de-asserting the 
line for the start-of-frame.      
The hardware sandbox was customized and tailor-made for the RS232-UART module.  
Using the protocol above, a checker was built from the OVL Cycle Sequence module to monitor 
the transmission signals.  A virtual UART component was included to receive the expected 
transmission and only transmit to the rest of the system if the protocol was followed correctly.    
For brevity, this thesis will only focus on one of the many implemented RS232-UART 
Trojans, named the T-900.  This Trojan solely impacts the UART transmission through denial-
of-service after activation by transmitting a specific sequence of data.  The following subsections 
give the simulation results of the RS232-UART without the Trojan, with the Trojan, and with the 
hardware sandbox in use. 
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2.3.1   Trojan-Free RS232-UART Transmitter 
 
Figure 3.  Trojan-Free RS232-UART Transmission Waveform 
 
From Figure 3, we can adequately see the valid, uninterrupted RS232 transmission 
protocol the UART module uses.  This protocol is based on the following signals: xmitH, used to 
signal the start of a transmission, xmit_dataH, used to denote the 8-bit data to transmit, 
uart_xmit_dataH, representing the serialized, UART data line, and xmit_doneH, used to signal 
when the transmission is complete.  For an RS232 transmission, after xmitH is asserted, the 
xmit_dataH signal is sampled and the transmission begins.  The uart_xmit_dataH line begins low 
for 16 clock cycles representing the start bit.  After, the serialized line follows the data in the 
sampled xmit_dataH, bit-by-bit, for 16 clock cycles each, starting from the LSB.  Once finished 
with sending all 8 bits, the uart_xmit_dataH line will be asserted for 31 clock cycles representing 
both the parity bit (16 cycles) and the stop bit (15 cycles).  Once complete, xmit_doneH is 
asserted to indicate the full transmission is finished on the 16th cycle for the stop bit.   
2.3.2   RS232-UART Transmitter with the T-900 Hardware Trojan 
 
Figure 4.  T-900 Trojan-Injected RS232-UART Transmission Waveform  
Figure 4 shows how the T-900 Trojan affects the RS232 transmission sequence.  In the T-
900 Trojan, when the user transmits the data 0xAA, 0x55, 0x22, and 0xFF, in that order, the 
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Trojan’s payload is triggered and blocks all future transmission.  This is clearly seen in Figure 4. 
 After the start of the transmission of 0xFF by asserting xmitH, nothing is ever serialized on 
uart_xmit_dataH, and xmit_doneH is never asserted.  Thus, this UART module has effectively 
been placed under a denial-of-service.  Also, because uart_xmit_dataH and xmit_doneH are both 
low, indicating in normal operation data is currently being transmitted, any IP in the full system 
this Trojan-injected module is connected to, such as other UART modules, would experience 
problems and loss of integrity and availability from this malicious behavior.  Therefore, the 
invalid behavior needs to be contained. 
2.3.3   Hardware Sandboxed RS232-UART Transmitter with the T-900 Hardware Trojan 
 
Figure 5.  T-900 Trojan Injected RS232-UART Transmission with the Hardware Sandbox 
Waveform 
 
The hardware sandbox is demonstrated in Figure 5.  The signals v_uart_xmit_dataH and 
v_xmit_doneH represent the virtual UART signals coming from the hardware sandbox that 
interface to the rest of the system.  As we can see, when the T-900 Trojan becomes active in the 
same manner as seen in Figure 4 with the transmission sequence, the fire signal from the OVL 
Cycle Sequence is asserted for a single clock cycle in the two locations shortly after xmitH is 
asserted, indicating the aforementioned problem in the transmission.  Because in addition to 
checking the properties of the signals we include the virtual UART module in our hardware 
sandbox, the rest of the system is not negatively affected by the Trojan’s misbehavior.  This is 
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seen in the virtual UART signals.  The real, valid transmission is still received virtually and 
transmitted out when the protocol is correct.  Once a problem is found in the sandboxed module, 
the transmission ends.  However, instead of incorrectly outputting that the serial line is busy and 
transmitting to the rest of the system as the Trojan would, v_uart_xmit_dataH and v_xmit_doneH 
output correct values for no transmission.  Thus, through the hardware sandbox, we have 
effectively isolated the reach of the hardware Trojan from affecting the availability and integrity 
of the entire system, and we have detected the first moment when an error in protocol has 






Chapter 3   System Design and Implementation for Jamming Prevention  
3.1     Overview 
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated how the design of the hardware sandbox is 
capable of preventing malicious hardware Trojan behavior from affecting a system’s integrity 
and availability through the monitoring and checking of defined signal properties and inclusion 
of virtual resources.  Utilizing the same structure, we can define a hardware sandbox to detect 
and prevent RF jamming from compromising a drone system.  The following sections outline our 
current drone system and how we can leverage and design the hardware sandbox for our anti-
jamming needs.   
3.2     Materials and Platforms 
3.2.1     Hexacopter Drone 
 
Figure 6.  Skeleton Hexacopter Drone  
 
Our base drone design is given in Figure 6.  For this project, we use the commercially 
available multicopter drone, the XAircraft DIY Hexa.  This drone features six arms, and thus six 
motors for flight control, providing added stability and fault tolerance compared to a typical 
quadcopter drone with only four motors.  In multicopter systems, the steering control of the 
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drone is based around three axes: yaw, pitch, and roll [17].  The copter is able to rotate at will 
around these three axes in order to ascend, descend, turn, or fly accordingly.  A flight controller 
must be capable of sending a transmission that can be interpreted to adjust these parameters for 
the drone.   
3.2.2     Control Transmitter and Receiver 
 
Figure 7.  Spektrum DX7SE Transmitter and AR7010 Receiver 
 
Our current drone uses the Spektrum DX7SE transmitter and the Spektrum AR7010 
receiver, as pictured in Figure 7.  This transmitter/receiver combo operates in the 2.4 GHz RF 
band using Spektrum’s proprietary DSM2 DSSS-based technology.  Once paired and 
transmitted, the receiver gathers the transmitted signals and decodes them into seven channels to 
control the drone: throttle, ailerons, elevators, rudder, gear, auxiliary-1, and auxiliary-2.  For 
direct control of the drone, the key signals here are the throttle and the ailerons, elevators, and 
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rudder, which control the roll, pitch, and yaw of the drone, respectively.  Under normal 
conditions, when the controller is paired and transmitting to the receiver, these seven channels 
exhibit the same properties: each signal follows a pulse width modulation (PWM) with pulse 
length between around 5% and 9%, depending on user input, at a frequency around 45.45 Hz.  
While the pulse length can be programmed on the controller to be modified by the user, we keep 
the parameters at these values.  These seven signals are cascaded, one after the other, with the 
following pattern:  ailerons, auxiliary-1, gear, elevators, auxiliary-2, throttle, and rudder.  Once 
one signal finishes its PWM pulse, the next in the pattern begins immediately after.  Once all are 
complete, all signals are low for the remaining period time.  When the transmitter and receiver 
are disconnected, however, such as when the controller is turned off after transmitting, the 
receiver still generates the PWM-based signals, albeit at an initial, slower frequency that 
decreases with time spent disconnected.   
3.2.3     Digilent Zybo 
 




The Zybo (Zynq Board) FPGA by Digilent, pictured in Figure 8, provides us the 
necessary features and functionality for a hardware/software system, such as our drone system. 
 The Zybo includes the Xilinx Zynq-7010 System-on-chip, featuring a dual core ARM Cortex-
A9 processor, along with Xilinx 7-Series FPGA logic [18].  The board features a number of 
multimedia and connectivity peripherals, of which the UART and SD are instrumental to this 
thesis.  The UART peripheral was used for terminal communication and obtaining various design 
information, such as the sequence of cascaded signals from the receiver, while the SD was used 
for running embedded Linux and storing the necessary kernel drivers.  This board also features 
six PMOD connectors, which are also vital for this drone system to interface to various, external 
devices, including the Spektrum receiver and the drone’s motors.  While it is a fairly small Zynq-
based FPGA board compared to others such as the Digilent Zedboard or the Xilinx ZC702, the 
Zybo is perfectly suitable for our design requirements.   
3.2.4     ArduCopter Software 
For flight control, this drone system uses the open source ArduCopter software by 
ArduPilot.  This software was originally designed for Arduino-based boards, but through a 
hardware abstraction layer, it can be ported for many different boards, including those featuring 
the Zynq system-on-chip, such as the Zybo.  Prior to this thesis project, the ArduCopter code had 
already been ported and compiled for use on the ARM processor found on the Zybo.  However, 
because of the dependencies in the code, such as threading, an operating system had to be built 
for the Zybo to run ArduCopter. 
3.2.5      Embedded Linux 
In order to run the ArduCopter software, we turned to using embedded Linux.  We built 
the Linux kernel for the Zybo, provided by Digilent, and used Buildroot for creating a root file 
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system to include the required libraries and C++ support for running the software.  The main 
takeaway for this thesis, however, is that because we run the flight software on top of the Linux 
kernel, a device driver had to be written and loaded into the kernel for the hardware sandbox and 
other IPs in the system to access their respective hardware registers. 
3.3   Drone Design 
Combining the previous information about our thesis-relevant materials and platforms, 
our simplified, high-level system design for the unsecured drone is given in Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9.  High-Level Drone System Design 
 
Of the modules and components to this system, only the two control IPs were not 
previously mentioned: the Receiver Control IP and the Motors Control IP.  These two hardware 
IPs simply provide an interface for the ArduCopter software to read and write to and from the 
receiver’s signals and the directly-connected drone motors.  Please note, however, that do to the 
nature of this thesis, only the pertinent hardware and system-level components for flight control 
and its security are considered here.   
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For control of the copter, the user transmits the controller’s input from the Spektrum 
DX7SE to the AR7010 receiver.  After decoding the RF transmission into the seven control 
channels, these signals are fed to the Receiver Control IP for register storage.  These control 
register values are fetched regularly by the CPU in the ArduCopter software running on Linux 
and must be processed to determine the state of the six motors of the hexacopter drone.  These 
motor values are then written from software to the hardware registers of the Motor Control IP 
and sent out via PMOD connectors to the physical motors of the drone.   
This design, however, is unsecure and susceptible to jamming attacks on the transmission 
and reception process to negatively impact or take down the flight.  Note that if an attacker 
wishes to disrupt this flight control flow, the only means to do so would be through an RF 
receiver like the Spektrum AR7010 used.  While preventing the attacker from jamming our real 
transmission signal is impossible, if we can protect the system from a potentially compromised 
receiver, we can secure the flight of the drone.  This follows the nature of hardware sandboxing. 
3.4   Hardware Sandbox Integration 
Because we treat the receiver as a non-trusted component with the possibility of being 
compromised by a jammer, we can utilize the hardware sandbox in a similar fashion as seen in 
Chapter 2 with respect to isolating hardware Trojans.  We place the hardware sandbox on the 
boundary of the external RF receiver to monitor its signals, as seen in our new, secure system 




Figure 10.  High-Level Drone System Design with Hardware Sandboxing 
 
The signals from the receiver are monitored for the possibility of malicious behavior and, 
through a virtual receiver, only valid, protocol-following signals are output to the rest of the 
system for flight control.  In this way, we can know when a jamming attack is taking place and 
that the rest of the system will be as least negatively affected as possible.  A more detailed, high-
level diagram is given in Figure 11 and more detail regarding the principal components is given 
in the subsections below. 
 
Figure 11.  Receiver Hardware Sandbox Diagram 
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3.4.1    Signal Checker  
Because the protocol of the correct, paired receiver is known, as described in 3.2.2, we 
can build a checker using the OVL Cycle Sequence to sample the seven PWM-based signals for 
valid behavior at a constant rate, multiple times during a single PWM period.  To do this, we 
must divide the system clock (100 MHz) such that the frequency matches the original frequency 
of the PWM signals, around 45.45 Hz, multiplied by the sample rate.  For this thesis, we use a 
200x sample rate for a good balance between checker resolution and design area.  A 100x, 500x, 
1000x, and 2000x sample rate were also considered and their results are shown in Chapter 4.  
Because our checker works on the temporal nature of the signals, it is imperative to get as close 
to the correct frequency as possible.  Therefore, we employ the Xilinx Mixed-Mode Clock 
Manager (MMCM) Clocking primitive in the Xilinx Clocking Wizard IP core [19] to first 
generate a clock as close to 45.45 MHz and divide this down to 9.09 kHz (200x 45.45 Hz), 
which is now possible due to the two clocks being an even multiple of one another.  The closest, 
initial clock possible with the MMCM primitive is 45.445 MHz.  While not the exact frequency, 
this is okay due to our necessary window-based checker design described in more detail shortly 
below.   
With the right clock frequency and number of times to sample in a period, we now turn 
our attention to generating the proper checking sequence for the OVL Cycle Sequence’s 
test_expression.  This sequence is based on the seven channels from the receiver: throttle 
(throttle), ailerons (aile), elevators (elev), rudder (rudd), gear (gear), auxiliary-1 (aux1), 
auxiliary-2 (aux2).  Unlike the static RS232-UART examples that follow the same sequence 
every transmission, every clock cycle, the receiver has the dynamic property described in 3.2.2 
where the start of the pulse of the current control signal is dependent upon the previous pulse 
24 
 
length, not a specific time value.  Therefore, a sequence generation algorithm had to be devised. 
 This is given below in Figure 12.   
 
Figure 12.  Sequence Generation Algorithm 
 
Utilizing this sequence generation algorithm and our sample rate of 200x, our sequence 
vector for test_expression would be 200 bits long, thus taking the full 200 clock cycles for the 
receiver PWM period to complete.  Before starting the algorithm, however, we must first 
synchronize with the receiver, waiting for the first rising edge of aile, as this signal is the first in 
the cascaded sequence described in 3.2.2.  Once synchronized, we start by first initializing the 
sequence bit with an always ’1’ to indicate that, because we should always be receiving a signal 
from the transmitter in a non-jammed environment, a check should always be running.  From 
there, we start checking the first pulse, aile, to ensure that only it is high for the first 5%.  After, 
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because the user’s control dictates the length of the PWM, the next 4% of the period is 
independent, and we can only check to ensure that both the signal goes low during this time and 
the other signals remain low.  Once the active signal goes low, we move onto the next signal’s 
pulse and repeat this process.  Finally, after ensuring all seven signals followed their correct 
pulse pattern, the remainder of the sample period is devoted to ensure all signals stay low. 
While this sequence bit generation represents the correct check to be used in our sandbox, 
in practice it needs to be made more complex.  Due to potential for jitter and inconsistent clock 
periods, this algorithm will not hold as it assumes a rigid PWM structure and period.  In fact, 
jitter is present on the AR7010 receiver’s clock, typically deviating by a margin of up to 0.3 Hz 
from the 45.45 Hz baseline.  Therefore, we need to allow for this margin by adding a short 
window to the time before and after the assumed end points of each signal pulse and total period.  
For the signal pulses, this window is added onto the 4% PWM length that is user-dependent.  As 
long as each signal pulse goes low during this period, we assume the signals are still behaving 
correctly.  Once the pulse does go low, we look to check the next signal pulse for correct 
behavior.  The same concept is applied for the full PWM period ending and starting anew with 
the rise of the signal, aile.  While this does not provide us with quite as fine-grain resolution as 
the validation UART tests in 2.3, any major deviance from the base protocol will still be 
detected, especially if the window size is small.  For this thesis, we use a window size of two 
clock cycles.  At a 200x frequency rate, this gives an approximate 0.45 Hz jitter tolerance to the 
base 45.45 Hz signal, which covers the observed 0.3 Hz maximum jitter.   
 With respect to the length of the window tolerance, we add the number of clock cycles 
onto the length of our sequence vector, test_expression – in our case, this is two cycles, and thus, 
two extra bits.  Because the signal is allowed to finish its full period during the window, we add 
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one more extra bit at the end to indicate whether or not the period actually finished during the 
window and a new one started or not.  Therefore, in total, our test_expression input is 203 bits 
long, and the Cycle Sequence takes 203 clock cycles to finish.  This is too long for a normal 
PWM signal period at our sample rate, and thus, we use the pipelined setting of the OVL Cycle 
Sequence to allow multiple checks to happen at the same time.  Whenever a new aile pulse 
begins during the end window, we start the next check while still allowing the current check to 
finish the remaining clock cycles.  This is not a problem as the generated sequence bits at the end 
during the window are independent from the rest of the sequence generation at the beginning, 
and therefore, there will never be overlapping, conflicting values between checks.   
3.4.2    Virtual Receiver/Manager 
 Next, we turn to including virtual resources in our drone receiver hardware sandbox to 
ensure our system cannot be compromised.  For our drone, this resource must be the receiver as 
both the attacker and the user share this hardware.  However, because all communication with 
the receiver happens via airwaves off the board, we cannot utilize our virtual resource in the 
same manner as other virtual resources: isolating the attack to prevent the physical resource from 
being compromised and affecting the rest of the system.  Instead, we can do just the opposite: 
allow the best, correct communication possible in spite of a compromised physical resource.  
Thus, we can include a virtual receiver to generate the PWM signals following the correct 
protocol as described in 3.2.2.  So long as the fire from our OVL cycle sequence-based checker 
is low representing correct behavior, we can simply pass the received signals to the rest of the 
system; otherwise, each channel defaults to a base PWM value from the point of error to the end 
of a full period.  We use the basic 5% PWM value as our default.  From there, we wait until we 
experience a full valid period without fire being asserted, indicating the jamming problem is 
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gone.  If this happens, we switch back to the received signals for the next period until fire is 
reasserted.  
 Extra care is needed to make the transition from received signals to our correctly-
generated signals seamless.  Therefore, we monitor the position of our sample during a full 
period and determine which signal is currently active and for how many clock cycles.  Based on 
this knowledge, if fire is asserted, we know exactly how to proceed for the remaining period.  
For example, if fire is asserted due to a signal pulse not lasting long enough, we can seamlessly 
take over and generate the correct pulse length without the rest of the system seeing the problem.  
The reverse is also true if the pulse remains high for too long.  The virtual receiver can begin the 
next signal’s pulse, outputting the correct protocol-behaving signals to the rest of the system.  
Due to this necessary ability, we must buffer the incoming received signals to align with the 
results from the OVL Cycle Sequence and our virtual receiver logic.   
 Our virtual receiver’s manager assumes the same flexible design that the sequence 
generation uses with regards to window size.  Because our virtual receiver’s output is based 
solely on the Cycle Sequence’s fire signal during a period, it is imperative that the incoming 
signals, the current check, and the virtual receiver’s position are all in sync.  For example, if the 
period of the signals were to deviate too far and invoke fire, our virtual receiver generation 
would start.  However, because of clock jitter, if the jamming were to be stopped, it is possible 
for the signals to make up the margin lost or gained by the frequency change when jammed and 
re-match our sequence generation logic.  Doing so, would cause fire to stop being asserted.  If 





3.4.3   Status Register 
  Lastly, we connect fire to a status register to be read via software to indicate if a problem 
has occurred.  We interface with this register through the AXI bus and protocol.  Since fire is 
only at most asserted for one clock cycle during a single check period, in order to guarantee that 
we can read the register to know a problem has occurred, we connect this signal to a D Flip-Flop 
with Enable, setting the enable to be a signal indicating whether the value has been read or not.  
When fire is asserted, this read signal goes low, meaning this value has not been read.  When a 
valid read has occurred in the AXI protocol, the read signal is asserted, and new values, such as 
fire being low, will now be stored.  Because embedded Linux was used, a character device driver 
was written to be able to read this register in the software running on Linux for potential logging.    
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Chapter 4   Tests and Results 
4.1    Overview 
 With our full design in place, we look to verifying our method through our tests, 
observations, and results.  We use the Vivado Design Suite and Flow provided by Xilinx for 
synthesis and implementation for the Zybo FPGA. We synthesize and implement using the 
Vivado Synthesis and Implementation Defaults.  We give our implementation results in Section 
2, provide assumptions related to the jamming impact on signals in Section 3, display simulation 
waveforms based on these assumption in Section 4, and finally, describe two short, real-world 
experiments to validate the signal checker’s ability to detect invalid behavior and the hardware 
sandbox’s ability to perform in a Linux environment in Section 5.   
4.2    Implementation Results  
 After implementation, we compare various performance metrics to show the resource 
overhead when utilizing the hardware sandbox.  Table 1 shows the utilization results of the 
individual, principle hardware sandbox components. 
 Slice LUTs (Util%) Slice Registers (Util%) 
Signal Checker 438 (2.49%) 379 (1.08%) 
Virtual Receiver/Manager 88 (0.5%) 55 (0.16%) 
Status Register 134 (0.76%)  171 (0.49%)  
Table 1.  Resource Overhead for Each Component in the Hardware Sandbox 
 While we use the full hardware sandbox in our design, depending on the design goals of 
the system, it is possible to strip elements, such as the status register, from the sandbox and save 
on resource usage.  As we can see, our signal checker makes up the majority of the required area 
of the hardware sandbox.  This makes sense as this component takes both the sequence 
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generation logic and the OVL Cycle Sequence.  As described in 3.4.1, the length needed for our 
checker at 200x sample rate is 203 bits.  The OVL Cycle Sequence pipes these 203 bits one 
register at a time for its logical tests, and therefore, as the sample rate increases, so does the area.  
Table 2 gives a few results of considered sample rates versus resource usage.   
Sample Rate Window Size Bit Length Slice LUTs (Util%) Slice Registers (Util%) 
100x 1 102 bits 290 (1.65%) 273 (0.78%) 
200x 2 203 bits 438 (2.49%) 379 (1.08%) 
500x 5 506 bits 867 (4.93%) 688 (1.95%) 
1000x 10 1011 bits 1597 (9.07%) 1198 (3.40%) 
2000x 20 2021 bits 3033 (17.23%) 2213 (6.29%) 
Table 2.  Utilization Results of Various Signal Checkers  
This table only displays the resource usage of the checker.  Because the sample rate 
increases, and thus the clock frequency in the sandbox, the window size must also increase to 
allow for the same total window time.  Bit length gives the total number of bits required for our 
sequence-based test_expression for the OVL Cycle Sequence.  As the sample rate increases, the 
resource utilization increases roughly linearly.  For additional security, an integrator may opt for 
a higher sample rate.  However, 200x offers ample coverage of our PWM signal while using 
fewer resources, and therefore, in this thesis, we utilize this rate.   
In order to show total resource overhead of our drone system design with and without 





 Slice LUTs (Util%) Slice Registers (Util%) 
Drone System 851 (4.84%) 938 (2.66%) 
Secure Drone System 1511 (8.59%) 1543 (4.38%) 
Table 3.  Utilization Results for the Drone Design with and without Hardware Sandboxing 
 
 As we can see in Table 3, the drone design with hardware sandboxing uses only 660 
more lookup tables and 605 more registers, representing an additional 3.75% and 1.72% of the 
Zybo's total available resources, respectively.  While the resource utilization in this context 
compared to the base drone system appears costly, with a 77.6% increase in LUTs and 64.5% 
increase in register slices, we argue this is reasonable.  First, the original design was not large to 
start so any resource increase through additional logic will make the design of magnitudes higher 
quickly.  Second, while the drone system can increase in size though additional functionality and 
feature set, the hardware sandbox will remain a fixed size.  This is due to the hardware sandbox 
being tailored for a specific protocol, which remains unchanged.  Therefore, in larger designs the 
hardware sandbox will not appear as obtrusive.  For the additional security, this small tradeoff is 
reasonable.    
 Worst Negative Slack (ns) Power (W) 
Drone Design 3.201 ns 1.657 W 
Secure Drone Design 2.663 ns 1.658 W 
Table 4.  Performance Metrics for the Drone Design with and without Hardware Sandboxing 
 Table 4 lists the timing and power result comparison between designs.  The worst 
negative slack displays the lowest setup slack in the system from a 10 ns period (considering the 
100 MHz system clock frequency) with the larger value meaning a greater cushion to meet 
timing.  First, while our drone design with hardware sandboxing meets the same timing 
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requirements as that of the base design, it has a longer critical path by 0.538 ns in the path to the 
memory mapped registers found in the IPs and status register.  This increase is not from the logic 
of the signal checker or the virtual receiver, but rather found in a path in the AXI memory 
mapped registers logic, and largely due to a longer routing delay from the larger design.      
The second aspect in Table 4 is the power consumption.  This was performed at the 
default settings in Vivado's power estimator at 25 degrees Celsius ambient temperature.  As 
evident, the power consumption is largely the same, with both having the Zynq processing 
system consume roughly 92% of the reported power.  Even though there is added logic with the 
hardware sandbox, because it operates at many magnitudes slower frequency than the rest of the 
system (on the order of kHz versus MHz), the power consumption impact is negligible. 
4.3    Jamming Assumptions 
 Because building and testing a full jammer for our transmitter/receiver combination is out 
of the scope of this thesis, we make a couple of assumptions and hypotheses regarding the 
impact of jamming on the seven cascaded control signals output from the receiver before testing 
our design.  First, because jamming aims to disrupt and even fully block communication to the 
receiver, a behavior of the signals under full jamming would be the equivalent of turning off the 
transmitter to prevent the receiver from receiving any form of valid transmission.  In our case, as 
mentioned in 3.2.2, when the controller is turned off and disconnected from the receiver, the 
frequency of the PWM signals decreases.  Therefore, full jamming has the ability to alter the 
frequency of the signals output from the controller and must be prevented. 
 Second, because it is possible to only jam parts of a transmission such that while the 
receiver still receives communication, parts of it could be incorrect, as demonstrated in jamming 
bits in WLAN communication [20], a possibility of signal behavior under partial jamming would 
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be wrong PWM pulse lengths stemming from the disrupted transmission.  We do not believe this 
to be a strong assumption due to the controller's ability to initially program the sensitivity range 
of control aspects, which in turn would affect the PWM pulse of the signals.  While we keep the 
pulses between 5% and 9%, we assume a jammed transmission has the potential to alter these 
lengths.  However, unlike the first assumption regarding full jamming, which has solid support 
from manual observation, we note that this assumption would require future testing and research 
to accurately verify.  For the sake of this thesis project, however, we include it.   
4.4    Simulation Testing 
 Based on our assumptions, we simulate various test cases in Xilinx ISim to show the 
hardware sandbox is capable of detecting and preventing the malicious behavior from affecting 
the rest of the system.  All of the following waveforms depict the same signals.  Jam represents 
the period in which the transmission is being jammed, and thus, the impact on the signals is felt, 
and fire is the output from the signal checker’s OVL Cycle Sequence to indicate bad behavior.  
The seven control signals under the header “From RX” represent the potentially compromised 
signals being output from the receiver before the hardware sandbox, and the seven signals under 
the header “To System” represent the protocol-conforming signals coming from our hardware 









4.4.1   Jamming Impact – Short Pulses 
 
Figure 13.  Jamming with the Hardware Sandbox (Short Pulse) Waveform 
 
 In Figure 13, we look at the hardware sandbox’s ability to fight off jamming which 
impacts the PWM signals from reaching minimum pulse length.  In this example, when jam is 
high, the remaining signals to be sent are changed from an 8% pulse to that of a 2.5% pulse.  
When this happens, we detect the incorrect protocol from our signal checker, fire is asserted, and 
our virtual receiver seamlessly takes over from this spot generating the remaining signals at a 5% 
pulse length.  We wait one additional period to ensure the jamming is finished and the incoming 







4.4.2   Jamming Impact – Long Pulses 
 
Figure 14.  Jamming with the Hardware Sandbox (Long Pulse) Waveform 
 
 The reverse is true for pulses which exceed the maximum pulse length as in Figure 14.  
Again, we are capable of detecting this behavior, as seen in the fire signal. The remaining period 
is spent generating the valid signals.  Note that prior to the jamming occurring, the signal to the 
reset of the system, aux1_o, reaches the maximum pulse length, 9%, compared to aile_o being 
sent for 8% and gear_o being sent for the default 5%.  This shows the seamless transition from 
still correctly behaved signals, prior to the OVL Cycle Sequence detection, to the generated 
signals from the virtual receiver.  We allow only the minimum to maximum pulse length to be 






4.4.3   Jamming Impact – Short Period 
 
Figure 15.  Jamming with the Hardware Sandbox (Short Period) Waveform 
 
 For Figure 15, when jam is enabled, we decreased the period of the receiver signals by 
10% to indicate a faster PWM frequency and observed the results.  As you can see, again, we are 
capable of detecting this change in protocol.  Notice, in this case, fire is asserted twice in a very 
short interval.  This is due to the signal checker detecting aile being asserted (due to the short 
period, a new period beginning with aile starts again) during the interval where all signals should 
remain low in the correctly-conforming protocol.  Thus, fire is asserted.  Fire is reasserted when 
the next check automatically begins and discovers that aile is not high for the required 5% pulse 
length due to aile already being asserted prior due to the shorter period.  In either case, the faster 
signals are never output to the rest of the system, as we can see in the “To System” signals.  The 
virtual receiver takes over to generate signals at the correct frequency.   
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 In this waveform, we simulate possible jitter in our receiver by decreasing the PWM 
signal frequency by 1% under normal conditions.  Due to the short window allowed in both the 
checker and the virtual receiver, this gives us the ability to dynamically adapt to correct signals.  
As the waveform shows, after jam goes low, the signals are still off, and therefore, trigger fire a 
couple more times.  However, after enough time has passed for the signals to become back in 
sync, the system is corrected for a full period, and the virtual receiver manager switches back to 
the real signals to be output to the system.   
4.4.4   Jamming Impact – Long Period 
 
Figure 16.  Jamming with the Hardware Sandbox (Long Period) Waveform 
 
 In our next simulation test, in Figure 16, we look at the behavior opposite to that in 
Figure 15.  Here we increased the period of our base signals by 7.5% to demonstrate a slower-
received PWM frequency.  Again, our signal checker detects this behavior when aile is never 
reasserted during the end window to signal the correct start of a new period.  Thus, our virtual 
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receiver takes over and begins the signal generation at the correct time.  We simulate possible 
clock jitter in this example with a 1% faster PWM frequency than normal to show how the signal 
can resynchronize back with our sequence generation logic over time after the jamming signal is 
no longer present.  Again, after the first correct check, we switch from our virtual receiver 
generation to the real signals seamlessly.  
 Thus, in all simulation tests, we were successful in detecting the jamming behavior from 
our assumptions and in the generation of correctly-followed PWM protocol signals to the rest of 
the system.  We demonstrated the seamless takeover from the virtual receiver and back to the 
real signals when jamming is no longer present.    
4.5    Real-World Testing 
 Outside of simulating, we performed two real-world tests utilizing the Spektrum DX7SE 
transmitter and AR7010 receiver with the hardware sandbox elements implemented on the Zybo 
FPGA.  In both tests, our objective was to be able to send all valid inputs on the controller and 
observe the hardware sandbox performing correctly.  Our first test, however, focused solely on 
the signal checker’s accuracy, while the second ensured the full hardware sandbox worked 
correctly in a Linux environment.  We simulated a jammed environment by turning off the 
controller during the test with the expected behavior that fire of the OVL Cycle Sequence should 
be asserted due to the transmission not being received by the receiver.  We also tested the ability 
to resynchronize the system after jamming by turning the controller back on and observing the 
output. 
4.5.1   Signal Checker LED Test 
To perform this test, we modified our drone design with only the signal checker included 
to allow fire from the OVL Cycle Sequence to be output to the LEDs of the Zybo FPGA, such 
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that when fire is asserted, the LEDs will turn on.  We plugged the receiver’s seven channels into 
one of the PMOD connectors on the FPGA and turned on the transmission controller to find the 
paired receiver.  Our new modified, design bitstream was then downloaded onto the board for 
observation. 
Initially, the LEDs were turned off, indicating that fire is not asserted and that a problem 
has not occurred.  This matches our expectation as we have not modified anything at this point.  
Next, we adjusted the various control inputs on the controllers, moving the flight sticks and 
toggling the gear, elevators, and auxiliary switches.  When doing so, again, the LEDs on the 
Zybo did not blink, meaning our OVL Cycle Sequence is accepting the changed PWM values 
correctly.  Next, we turned off the controller and observed the LEDs.  Here, the LED turned on, 
indicating that fire is continually being asserted.  This again matches our expectation because as 
described in 3.2.2, when the controller and receiver are not linked, the receiver outputs the PWM 
signals at a slower frequency.  Finally, we turned the controller back on.  When this occurred, the 
LED on the board stayed lit for a brief period of time before turning off.  This behaves exactly 
like our simulation results where after jamming has finished, there exists an interval where fire is 
still being asserted while it resynchronizes from the deviating clock period.  Thus, our real world 
test with the controller and receiver matched our initial hypothesis and expected behavior of the 
signal checker under various conditions.   
4.5.2   Full Hardware Sandbox Test 
 For the last real-world test, we added all elements of the hardware sandbox back to the 
drone design and removed the LED-fire output connection.  Now, fire is being output only to the 
status register to be read.  Because the working drone would utilize the embedded Linux OS to 
run its software, we created a test C application to read a byte from the contents of the device file 
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associated with the status register IP and its physical address space on a loop every one second.  
We cross-compiled and placed this application, the character device driver for the status register 
IP, and all necessary files for booting Linux on the Zybo onto an SD card.  When booted, we 
loaded our device driver kernel module, ran our test application, and observed the results from 
the still-connected AR7010 receiver and paired DX7SE transmitter.   
 The results of this test validate our design.  As expected, because the controller is paired 
and sending, the values being read and outputted to the terminal were 0, because fire is low.  
When changing the inputs on the controller, like the previous test, the outputted value was still 0.  
However, when the controller disconnected, and fire was asserted, we were able to read 255 
(0xFF), which represents the value from fire being connected to every bit in the status register.  
When we reconnected the controller by turning it back on, the value eventually changed back to 
0, meaning fire is low again.  As a result, our hardware sandbox is capable of reading the 
deviated protocol assertion in software in Linux for logging.   
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Chapter 5   Conclusion and Future Work 
5.1    Conclusion 
 Protecting against jamming attacks to hijack unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, is of 
utmost priority due to their recent, widespread surge in both civilian and military space.  In this 
thesis, we designed and implemented a system that has the capability of detecting and reacting to 
jamming attacks to better secure drones.  We leveraged our current work of the hardware 
sandbox on hardware Trojans for the monitor and rule enforcement of the Spektrum AR7010 
receiver's control PWM signal protocol from the DX7SE transmitter in our system.  We tailored 
our hardware sandbox specifically for this receiver/transmitter pair.  This was accomplished by 
studying and analyzing the behavior of the Spektrum AR7010 receiver and the protocol it 
followed.  From the established protocol, we designed an algorithm in VHDL to generate the 
valid sequence bits based on the seven control signals to be used in conjunction with the OVL 
Cycle Sequence module.  In addition, we created a virtual receiver signal generator in VHDL to 
isolate the potentially jammed receiver from the rest of the system.  Our virtual receiver is 
capable of seamlessly switching from real, transmitted signals to and from the virtually, 
generated signals without notice from the rest of the system.  While our virtual receiver gives us 
an ability to react via hardware, we also employed memory-mapped status registers to give us an 
ability to react to attacks via software in a Linux environment.     
 Our hardware sandbox-based drone design was targeted for use on the Xilinx Zynq 
processing system and FPGA fabric.  We implemented the design for the Digilent Zybo FPGA 
and analyzed the performance and resource metrics.  We proved that despite the addition of 
hardware in the middle of the receiver and the control IP, we consume virtually identical power 
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and do not significantly affect the timing of the system, while only using a comparatively small 
amount of board resources.   
 We have shown functional verification of our system through a number of possible 
jamming simulation tests of both full and partial jamming and a checker/status register 
verification using real-world delay and timing with the two real-world tests.  Our hardware 
sandbox performs successfully in the detection of an improper protocol, an achievement also 
demonstrated via our previous hardware Trojan tests.  Our simulation results also demonstrate 
the isolation requirement of sandboxing by disallowing the incorrect signals from spreading to 
the system.  While future research would need to be performed in order to fully and accurately 
understand the behavior of our specific transmitter and receiver under partial jamming, our 
methods and results are still valid for full jamming and can be applied and analyzed for partial 
jamming in our receiver and future others.  Regardless, as jamming aims to disrupt the 
communication and flight path of a drone, it is anticipated that the control signals to the system 
would be disrupted too in the case of partial jamming.   
 While this thesis project was performed utilizing the Spektrum model AR7010 receiver 
and DX7SE transmitter, our same design approach and philosophy for the hardware sandbox is 
applicable to other RF drone receiver and transmitters.  The only condition required for use is for 
the receiver to follow a well-defined, consistent protocol when interfacing to the system, which 
is expected in any control system.  With this, a hardware sandbox signal checker and virtual 
receiver can be defined and designed specifically for the equipment used to detect and prevent 
malicious denial-of-service and other incorrect functional-based attacks.  Therefore, our work in 




5.2   Future Work 
 Our work on hardware sandboxing and its use in drone systems to prevent jamming is 
still young and offers many avenues for future development.  In this thesis, we discuss a few 
possible ways to improve and advance the current system, design, and implementation of the 
hardware sandbox.   
5.2.1    Automatic Generation of a Hardware Sandbox 
 While our hardware sandbox is designed specifically for the Spektrum AR7010 receiver, 
there are many other possible commercial or custom receivers to use, each possibly using a 
different control protocol for interfacing to the system.  Designing a hardware sandbox, in 
particular, the properties checker for the IP under sandbox, can require an extensive amount of 
time and testing to ensure correctness.  We would like to eliminate this cost by automatically 
generating the sandbox.  As mentioned earlier, the design of a hardware sandbox first requires 
knowledge of the specific protocol and properties of the signals under monitor.  Therefore, if we 
can define the signal properties in a universal manner through a language, we can use tools to 
parse and generate the required principle components of the sandbox.  This future work has 
implications beyond drone attacks, as the hardware sandbox can be applied in many situations, 
such as the aforementioned hardware Trojan isolation.   
 There are some pre-existing, open-source tools which can accomplish the compilation of 
a universal property language into HDL sources.  One such tool in particular, Lily [21], while 
based on Linear Temporal Logic synthesis [22], allows for the compilation of LTL-style PSL-
defined properties to output, if possible, a synthesizable Verilog module.  We can extend and use 




5.2.2   Further Exploration of Partial Jamming 
 As discussed earlier, the effects of only partially jamming a transmission are assumed and 
not fully known for our receiver model.  Therefore, a further analysis and study would need to be 
performed to fully understand the behavior in order to validate our assumptions.  Doing so 
requires building a jammer that is capable of jamming a small subset of the controller’s 
transmission and observing the effect.  
5.2.3    Adaptive Flight Measures in Conjunction with Hardware Sandboxing 
 Our hardware sandbox offers the ability to respond to jamming behavior in both 
hardware and software after detection from the signal checker.  At the current moment, we 
utilize in hardware a virtual receiver to generate correct, yet basic PWM signals to the system in 
case of jamming, while in software, use the status register to make a log if jamming occurred.  
However, more advanced adaptive flight measures are possible after detection.  For example, 
routines in the ArduCopter software could be devised to return the drone to its original source 
away from the attacker when jamming occurs.   
 In hardware, we can use adaptive techniques such as partial reconfiguration to thwart 
attackers when jammed.  This measure would require the integration of the receiver and its 
ability to decode a transmission into the seven PWM channels into our hardware from the current 
external module.  For example, if jammed, we could load a new receiver’s transmission decoding 
module IP in a reconfigurable partition that utilizes a different set of spreading codes.  While this 
would mitigate jamming for attackers who know at least a subset of the spreading codes and how 
to jam a certain frequency channel, this would also affect the legitimate controller and 
transmitter.  Thus, additional exploration would be needed on how to securely notify the flight 
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